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RECONSTRUCTING IDENTITY: 
A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE 
AYANNA FERDINANDI 
ABSTRACT 
Challenged by adverse experiences in the first year of law school, 
the author of this paper uses her experience to trigger an analysis of 
identity discourse in the law. In Part I, she shares her experience and 
characterizes it as an epistemological dilemma to the traditional legal 
methods of identity construction. She introduces the two traditional 
methods of identity construction: the impartial trajectory and the cat-
egorical trajectory and briefly demonstrates that, because her experience 
was specific to her first year law school at Dalhousie University, both 
trajectories limit her claim to knowledge. Using her own experience and 
others found in the literature, the author reconstructs a legal paradigm to 
identity. Throughout the paper, the author draws upon illustrations, 
literature and theory from various sources: (dis)ability, gender, race, and 
sexual orientation. It is in the author's view that all of these claims 
encounter similar challenges to expression and identity. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. 
There is no other way." 1 
Justice Harry Blackmun 
This paper is an attempt to expose and analyse the complex of 
conceptions of identity and equality captured by Mr. Justice Blackmun's 
I Ayanna Ferdinand is a fourth year student in the joint LLB/MHSA program at Dalhousie 
University. She has an undergraduate degree, with honours, from Concordia University in 
philosophy. Ayanna's interests lie primarily in health law and how it relates to corporate 
governance. After her legal education, Ayanna will be articling at a law firm and a major 
hospital in Toronto. 
1Regents of the University of Cal!fomia v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (U.S. 1978) at 2. 
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directive. According to Blackmun J's quote, the imperative is that to end 
discriminatory practices against certain races, we must first recognize 
and legitimize how members of those races experience discrimination. 
A necessaiy corollary to this imperative is to use the ground upon which 
unequal treatment is based as the point of consideration to justify 
distinctive treatment. Upon first read, then, the impression is that to 
construct and adhere to an equality principle, the first step is to render 
legitimate the ground upon which the denial of equal consideration has 
occurred. By legitimizing it, we come to recognize that race can be a 
fundamental part of a person's experiences in the world and that race can 
be an inextricable part of the person's identity. Hence, Blackmun J 
suggests that to treat individuals equally does not mean to treat them the 
same. 
However, Blackmun J's quotation begs for a more complex under-
standing, which is explored in this paper. The quotation reveals the 
circularity of the method used to move beyond discrimination. Discrimi-
nation is repulsive for the reason that characteristics are misattributed to 
an individual based upon the individual's physical characteristics, 
which may or may not play a role in the formation of the individual's 
identity. This perceived difference is used to justify the denial of equal 
oppo1iunity. Yet, in adopting the method proposed by Blackmun J., the 
individual's perceived difference is used to justify the means to secure 
equality. The contention is that to get beyond racism, we must first 
locate the difference in the person and then construct an equality prin-
ciple from that difference. 
An individual is protected from discrimination by first identifying 
the grounds upon which he or she has met discrimination; thus, the 
individual's identity is defined by reference to the ground upon which he 
or she has met the discrimination. This method implies that the indi-
vidual can never shed the perceived difference, because in the hopes to 
end discrimination, difference will be imposed on the individual as the 
first point of justification to create an equality principle. This method 
does not recognize that the problem may be with racism and not race, 
which would locate the problem not in the individual but in the myriad 
of relationships that occur in a social context. 
The following is an analysis of the methods traditionally adopted to 
construct identities with the goal of establishing a comprehensive prin-
ciple of equality. The two traditional concepts examined in this paper are 
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the impartial trajectory, which holds that identity can be ascertained by 
meritorious behaviour and is devoid of context and; the categorical 
trajectory, which operates under the notion that identity is only mean-
ingful in relation to systematically classifying individuals according to 
perceived dominant traits. The paper demonstrates that the impaitial 
trajectory and the categorical trajectory are inherently problematic and 
that an alternative to these traditional notions of identity is required. 
While judgments regarding identity and equality can be exclusionary, 
these kinds of judgments, in my analysis, are not central to the problem 
of identity and equality. Judgments and practices that do not subordi-
nate, however, are key to reconstructing concepts of identity and equal-
ity. Specifically, I argue that contextual post-categorical judgment is not 
only an alternative to the flawed trajectories in that it overcomes the 
problems of subordination; but it is the necessary next step in the debate 
of identity and equality. 
Pait I of this paper provides a summary of the experiences which 
have compelled me to invest a considerable amount of attention to this 
subject followed by a brief discussion of the epistemological dilemma 
that arose from these experiences. Part II explores and dismisses the two 
traditional conceptions of equality: identity through merit and identity 
through categories. Relying on 'difference' discourse, Part III offers an 
alternative method to unsettle the traditional ways of defining identity 
and of constructing an equality principle. I argue that difference is not 
intrinsic, and that this understanding implicitly transforms traditional 
conceptions of identity. 
It is worth noting that the method adopted in this paper is to draw 
upon illustrations, literature and theory from various sources and that the 
analysis is not limited to identity and equality claims based on race. 
Concerns regarding disability, sexual orientation and gender intersect in 
this paper because, as it is demonstrated in the body of the paper, all of 
these claims encounter similar challenges with regards to expression and 
identity. Also to adopt a method that limits the discussion to one claim 
of equality, in my view, is to deny the complexity of identity and 
equality that is proposed in this paper. 
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II. FRAMING THE ISSUE 
1. Women, Fire and Dangerous Things2 
During my first semester of law school, a member of the legislative 
assembly asked the Premier of Nova Scotia for the reason why the 
provincial government commissions private law firms who do not em-
ploy, "one Nova Scotian black or aboriginal lawyer."3 The then Premier 
of Nova Scotia, Russell MacLellan, responded to a question by stating: 
It is the fault of people who want to make believe that they are 
interested in minorities, the people who create a different program for 
blacks and aboriginals in the law school so that they can't have the 
same education or the same standard other students do. I'm not con-
vinced, frankly, there's one standard all the way through [law school]. 
All we are doing is leading the blacks and the aboriginals on. We've 
got to be fair with them. l want to be sure there is an equal footing, 
equal stance. There seems there isn't the same standard. That's fine if 
you want to get through, but you have to get a job.4 
The 'different program' to which the Premier was referring is the 
Indigenous Black and Mi'kmaq Program (IB&M) at Dalhousie Law 
School. The IB&M program is primarily a mechanism designed to 
facilitate admission to Dalhousie Law School for students who are black 
and indigenous to Nova Scotia as well as those of Mi'kMaq descent. 5 
2 G. Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987). Lakoff choose this title and I use it here 
because, although the phrase suggests that women, fire and dangerous things have something 
in common, they do not necessarily. He explains that the title is derived from Dyirbal, an 
Australian aboriginal language which has a category that includes women, fire and dangerous 
things. Yet the category also includes, for instance, birds that are not dangerous. He begins the 
book by suggesting that this is simply not a matter of categorization by common properties. 
Thus this holds significance for me and this paper because what Lakoff suggests here is 
analogous to how we all try to understand the world by looking for similarities among things, 
drawing conclusions from those similarities and forming categories based on what we under-
stand to be common to those things. However, Lakoff suggests that this manner of categoriza-
tion may be more complex than making associations based on what we perceive to be common 
to things. 
3 The member is Yvonne Atwell, NDP member of the Nova Scotia Legislative Assembly for 
Preston, Nova Scotia. 
4 "NDP points to lack of minority lawyers (Black and Mi'kmaq program)" Canadian Press 
Newswire (2 December 1998) D2. and Donalee Moutlon, "Comments on N.S. minority law 
program ignite uproar" The Lawyers Weekly (8 January 1999) 18(32). 
5 For additional infonnation and an historical perspective on the IB&M Admissions Program 
see: C. Aylward, "Adding Color-A Critique of: An Essay on Institutional Responsibility: The 
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Although the IB&M program provides support during the three 
years of law school, designating it as a separate program is misleading 
for it suggests those students are instructed and evaluated differently 
from those students not admitted though this mechanism. In my applica-
tion process to Dalhousie Law School, I was unaware that there was 
such an admission mechanism. In any case, being of Caribbean parent-
age (I was born in Quebec) and a resident of Montreal, would have made 
me ineligible for it. 
Early into my first semester of law school, I attended an "upper year 
dinner." Upper year dinners are social events where groups of first year 
law students are invited to dine at an upper year law student's home. Not 
long after my arrival to the upper year student's home, a conversation 
erupted regarding aboriginal students in their class. One of the upper 
year students said of an Aboriginal student "I do not regard her admis-
sion as one through an affirmative action program. Rather it is truly an 
equity program." The other student disagreed. I asked what they were 
talking about. The student who deemed the 'program' as one of equity 
tried to brush off the subject saying, "Oh, we are just gossiping ... we 
should probably stop now." As she put her hand on my shoulder, she 
stated "The bottom line is, it is a good thing that we have a program like 
this for people like you." It was then that I became acquainted with the 
IB&M Admissions Program. 
Following this discussion, I had several similar social encounters 
where white upper year law students mentioned to me that they genu-
inely thought it was a good thing that we had such a program for 'people 
Indigenous Blacks and Micmac Programme at Dalhousie Law School" (1995) 8 C.J.W.L. 470, 
and R. F. Devlin and A. Wayne Mackay, "An Essay on Institutional Responsibility: The 
Indigenous Blacks and Micmac Programme at Dalhousie Law School" 1991 14 Dalhousie L. 
J. 296. Briefly, Aylward refers to it as an" 'affirmative action' program because it is quota 
based i.e. only twelve students are admitted per year: six Black students and six Mi'kmaq 
students." Once the students identify themselves on the application for admission to Law 
School, selected students are offered interviews. Those who were successful in their inter-
views are then required to attend a month-long 'Introduction to Law' class during the summer 
where, if they pass, they are admitted to Law School, beginning in the fall. Once admitted, the 
students are expected to complete identical work as those students who were not admitted in 
this manner and are held to the same standard. In response to the Premier, Dean Russell stated, 
"He seemed to think that there was a different program for minorities. That, of course, is 
absolutely false. All students complete the same requirements and the same bar exams. 
Students' exams are identified by number rather than name, so that professors don't know who 
they're marking." Supra note 2. 
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like me. ' 6 I approached several of the black students who had been 
admitted through the IB&M program, to gain a balanced understanding 
of the program. Some of the students explained to me that all white 
people were racist, and suggested that the best way for me to do well in 
law school was to keep my distance from them. Since I did not accept 
this as a reasonable explanation or a sensible solution, I did not heed the 
advice and I did not 'stay away' from white students. As a result, over 
time my interactions with the black students became tenuous. 
At this point, I was grasping for perspective on these interactions. 
Guided by a professor, I approached one black student in second year 
law and another in third year. On separate occasions they explained to 
me that they, too, were the only black students in their year not accepted 
through the IB&M program. They shared their stories, and which were 
similar to my own: white upper year law students assumed they were 
admitted through the IB&M program had approached them to sympa-
thetically express their support for the program. Concurrently, many of 
the black law students admitted through the IB&M program had 
shunned them. My experiences culminated with an encounter after 
Christmas exams in a professor's office. Although I did not regularly 
attend class, I had received a B on a mid-term exam. I went to speak to 
the professor to explain why I had been missing class and to inquire 
about improving my grade in the final exam. As I sat down on a chair in 
his office, he expressed his delight that I should talk with him because he 
was worried that I was not doing well in his class. And, by the way, how 
was I managing in the IB&M program?7 
These experiences, particularly the interaction with my professor, 
were painful and frustrating because they used the color of my skin as 
6 See P. Monture, "Now that the Door is Open: First Nations and the Law School Experience" 
(1990) 15 Queen's L. J. 179 at 189 where she describes an event on her first day of law school 
where a white student expressed his anger suggesting that " ... perhaps one of his friends was 
not present because of me" and that, " ... the only reason I could have reached the hallow halls 
of the law school was by virtue of a special access program." She, in fact, had been admitted to 
law school not by a special access program. 
7 My reaction to these interactions is best described by J. Scales-Trent, Notes o.f a White Black 
Woman: Race, Color, Community (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
c.1995), where she states .... "How can one live inside the stigma, and yet remain enough 
untouched by it to do one's work? How can we fight against the stigma, fight against the belief 
that we are 'unqualified', and still retain enough energy and belief in our selves to enable us to 
get our work done? This is hard, but clearly it can be done." at 122. 
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sufficient reason to make assumptions about me. The identity of those 
admitted through the IB&M program remain confidential to other stu-
dents, professors and staff, to be revealed only by the student upon his or 
her election. There was no legitimate reason for the students or this 
particular professor to presume that I was admitted through the program. 
Moreover the interaction with my professor reveals the deeper problem 
with these assumptions. While I was in his office, I was so surprised by 
his question that I was unable to articulate to him, or even to myself, the 
reason for my shock. Dalhousie Law School prohibits self-identification 
on exams, and provides code number as a means of identification. 
Professors do not know whose exam they are marking. Reflecting on 
this after the interaction with professor revealed the source of my 
anxiety: I believed he was worried that I was not doing well in his class 
because he thought that I was admitted through the IB&M program. But 
why would he think that I was admitted through this program? To have 
asked me those questions before looking at my exam mark lead me to 
realize that he must have been certain of his conclusions with no regard 
to whether or not they were valid. Because of the color of my skin, he 
thought I must have been admitted through the program and thus, I must 
be struggling through law school. My distress during that first year, was 
not with the IB&M program and the stigma that may or may not be 
linked to it: the program was not the problem. Rather my struggle lay in 
the assumptions that others made about me based solely on the colour of 
my skin; assumptions are so fundamental to other's perceptions that 
they did not stop to question them. 
2. A Matter of Identity: Law and Epistemology 
Identity is a significant factor to the understanding oflaw and what it 
means to 'do justice'.8 Claims about identity shape and challenge the 
law. As a result, a meaning of equality evolves. For instance, law can be 
shaped by disability claims to provincial health plans9 or by demands 
for the inclusion of sexual orientation in human rights codes. 10 These 
claims inform the law on how to do justice by insisting that the law take 
8 J. McCristal Culp, Jr., "The Woody Allen Blues: 'Identity Politics, Race, And The Law'" 
(July 1999) 51 F.L.L.R. 511at514. 
9 Eldridge v. British Colombia (A.G.), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 624. 
10 Vriend v. Alberta [1998] I S.C.R. 493. 
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identity claims into account when choosing a just resolution to a dispute. 
Furthermore, programs like the IB&M Admission program are constitu-
tionally protected in Canada. I I The challenges inherent to being an 
indigenous black or Mi'kmaq in Nova Scotian have played a significant 
role in determining how the law should be guided to do justice. Section 
15(2) of the Charter is an exception to the general prohibition of 
discrimination, making it clear that although an affirmative action pro-
gram may discriminate against a member of a group traditionally re-
garded as advantaged, such programs are not precluded from legal 
protection. I2 Hence accounts of identity contribute to the fonnation and 
development of law and justice. 
While identity politics contribute to the understanding oflaw, law in 
tum is pivotal to a particular type of identity fo1mation. 13 The law 
significantly dictates how we define ourselves and how others define us. 
Implicitly, a parameter is drawn within which identity becomes mean-
ingful and other identities are constructed and distinguished from our 
own identities and from others. 
Postmodernist theories emphasize the contingent, indeterminate and 
constructed nature of categories within which we perceive and converse 
about the world, and within which we form our identities. Legal recogni-
tion of those 'constructions' contributes to social and political aware-
ness - or lack thereof - of identity claims. Furthermore, implicit in the 
view that identity arises from legal constructions is the recognition that 
the law has an authoritative role. I4 
Carl Stychin argues that section 15 of the Charter guarantees the 
protection and the development of newly emerging identities. Is He 
states: 
The equality guarantees within the Charter have facilitated an open-
ended interpretation by which individuals, as members of groups not 
11 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ,Part I of the Co11stit11tio11 Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 at section 15(2). [Hereinafter the 
Charter] 
12 P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2000 Student Ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2000) at 
1025. 
13 M. Davies and N. Seuffert, "Knowledge, Identity and The Politics of Law" (Summer 2000) 
11 H.S.T.W.L.J. 259 at 259. 
14 Ibid at 266. 
15 C.F. Stychin, "A Postmodern Constitutionalism: Equality Rights, Identity Politics, and the 
Canadian National Imagination" (Spring 1994) 17 Dalhousie L. J. 61. 
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explicitly recognised within the Constitution, can claim rights to 
equality before and under the law. 16 
For instance, the United States political and legal system defined what it 
meant to be black and what it meant to be white. These constructions 
continue to resonate in identity formation today. The 'one drop' rule in 
the Unites States legally dictated what was to be considered black: any 
indication of black/Negro ancestry in an individual, however remote, 
was sufficient to designate the individual as black, and thus socially and 
politically insignificantY Similarly, in his article entitled, "White by 
Law", 18 Lopez explores how in 1790 the United States Congress began 
to decide whether applicants for citizenship were white through natural-
ization laws as citizenship was limited to white applicants. He argues: 
As a taxonomy of Whiteness, these cases are instructive because of the 
imprecision and contradiction they reveal in the establishment of 
racial divisions between White and non-Whites. 19 
In Canada, the so-called Persons Case illustrates how law aids in the 
construction of identity.20 On appeal from the Supreme Court of 
Canada, Henrietta Muir Edwards and five other Canadian women asked 
the Privy Council to declare women 'persons' under the meaning of the 
British North America Act, 1867. 21 The Privy Council held that the word 
'person' in s.24 of the Act included members of either gender. Conse-
quently, women were eligible for appointment to the Senate. Most 
significantly, however, the decision altered the widespread understand-
ing that women were not persons, thereby reconstrncting what it meant 
to be a woman. 
Not unlike most of my classmates, I entered first year law with a 
strong sense of self. My belief was that who I am begins with how I 
define myself. However, in light of my interactions with those who 
possessed a divergent understanding of me, I questioned myself. My 
16 Ibid at 69. 
17 A part of what were known as the' Jim Crow' laws, which were a series of statutes passed in 
the late 19'11 century by legislatures in the Southern United States. 
18 I. F. Haney Lopez "White by Law" in R. Delgado and J. Stefancic, eds., Critical Race 
The01y: The Cutting Edge Second Ed.(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000) 626. 
19 Ibid at 626. 
20 Edwards v. Canada (Attomey General) [1930] A.C 124. 
21 Ibid. 
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confidence in my identity slowly ebbed away. In the context of law 
school, I stopped thinking of myself as a first year law student. I started 
to understand myself as a first year law student who is black and because 
of my blackness I am perceived to be a member of the IB&M program 
because I am incapable of acceptance to law school on my own merits. 
Although I knew that I had not been admitted through the IB&M 
program, I often wondered whether I deserved to be in law school, 
whether I was capable of getting the work done. I also began to wonder 
about other black students. When I met a black student I often asked 
myself: has she been admitted through the IB&M program? I divided 
students between those who had been admitted through the IB&M 
program and those who had not. My identity at that time was conflated 
with what it appeared to mean to others to be black and in law school. 
The foregoing examination reveals a fundamental epistemological 
presumption of law in the Western world: truth can be ascertained. As 
previously discussed, law and identity are inextricably linked: as law 
informs identity and as identity informs law, the presumption is that 
identity, conceptually speaking, is a characterization grounded in a 
reality that can be known. The significance of making this presumption 
explicit in identity discourse is that claims to equality and the formula-
tion of an equality principle is highly dependent on the law's ability to 
characterize and delineate identities. The law can only perform this task 
if it presumes that identity is comprehensibly knowable. 
The question arises then: how does the law sort through the various 
claims to identity with the goal of establishing and maintaining equality 
among individuals and groups of individuals? The difficulty in answer-
ing this question is located in the question itself. To establish and 
maintain equality among individuals and groups of individuals, law has 
traditionally adopted one of two methods. The law can choose to disre-
gard any characterization that would render an individual other than an 
'objective' claimant of the law. This method presupposes that character-
istics such as gender, class, race, (dis )ability and sexual orientation are 
i1Televant to claims of equality. Each case must be determined impar-
tially and strictly on its objective merits. Or, the law can favour a method 
that takes notice of disadvantaged or advantaged groups. This method 
accepts that gender, class, race, (dis )ability and sexual orientation are 
integral to equality claims. Both methods make claims to knowledge. 
The former method suggests that knowledge is attainable through im-
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partial assessment, which entails one standard of knowledge. The latter 
method operates under the contention that knowledge is contextually 
attainable. It begins with the premise that the world can be experienced 
and understood by several subjects through various methods. 
I ask myself, then, how does the law explain my claim to knowl-
edge? My experience as a first year law student was highly contextual, 
and specific to me. Thus the impartial epistemological claim to knowl-
edge does not help me. However, if I adopt the categorical method to 
attempt to explain my experience and to help maintain my identity, I am 
trapped in a method that contributed to the problem in the first place. 
Returning to Blackmun J's quotation, my claim to knowledge is invalid 
for the reason that in resorting to categorization I am lost in circularity. 
Indeed, I am black.22 And those perceptions of me were based on what it 
means to others to be black and in law school. However, being black 
does not fully explain my experience. In fact, it limits my claim to 
knowledge by suggesting that my struggle in first year law had only to 
do with discrimination based on race. Both the impartial trajectory and 
the categorical trajectory [discussed below] lack an account of knowl-
edge that helps me express my experience and voice my identity con-
cerns. Therefore, the law does not provide me with a legitimate claim to 
knowledge. With this dilemma in mind, the following section explores 
in significant detail both traditional claims to knowledge and how they 
fail in their application of equality. The analysis is not limited to my 
claim to knowledge, but explores these methods in light of other equal-
ity concerns. 
22 Crenshaw expands on the impact of this simple sentence in K. Crenshaw "Mapping The 
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, And Violence Against Women Of Color" (July 
1991) 43 STN.L.R 1241 at 1243 at 1297. She briefly discusses the significance of making such 
a statement in identity discourse in constrast to making statements such as, "I am a person who 
happens to be Black." Crenshaw states" 'I am Black' takes the socially imposed identity and 
empowers it as an anchor of subjectivity." 
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III. DECONSTRUCTING THE TRADITIONAL PARADIGMS 
1. Identity Through Merit 
(i) Discrimination as Dissimilar Treatment 
For the purposes of this paper, the impartial method incorporates the 
traditional approaches of the colour-blind and gender-neutral doctrines. 
Both doctrines date back to the 1960s and are also referred in equality 
discourse as the merit-based approach. Justification of this doctrine lies 
with equality being equated with equivalence and similarity. The gen-
der-neutral doctrine included such rhetoric as to be considered equal to 
men, be the same as men, where epistemologically there is one standard 
of knowing.23 Catherine MacKinnon characterizes the guiding impetus 
as 'we are as good as you so anything you can do, we can do. ' 24 
On the other hand, although the colour-blind doctrine faded signifi-
cantly from equality jurisprudence in the 1980s and the early 1990s, the 
courts and the legislatures in the United States have been resuscitating 
the colour-blind doctrine. 25 The proponents of the colour-blind doctrine 
deem the eradication of racial categorizations as an end in itself, rather 
than as a means of achieving racial justice. 26 In a case dismissing an 
affirmative action program at the University of Michigan Law School, 
the U.S. District court held that, "even when used for 'benign' purposes, 
they [racial classifications] have the potential for causing great divisive-
ness. For these reasons, all racial distinctions are inherently suspect and 
presumptively invalid."27 Thus to the impartialist, racism is overcome 
by eliminating racial categories altogether. 
23 C. A. Mackinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1987) at 33. 
24 Ibid at 35. 
25 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5'h Cir.) 1996, cert. Denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996), 
Grutter v. Regents of the University of Michigan et al. 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 2001 and 
Proposition 209 passed by Californians on November 5, 1996 which is a constitutional 
amendment prohibiting discrimination and racial and gender preferences in areas of public 
employment, education and contracting. 
26 T. Kateri Hernandez," 'Multiracial' Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of Color-
Blind Jurisprudence" ( 1998) 57 Md. L. Rev. 97 at 139-140. 
27Grutter v. Regents of the University of Michigan et al. 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 2001at872. 
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(ii) Weaknesses in the Impartiality Framework 
As an equality principle, the impartiality trajectory is deficient in 
several aspects. The following discusses how impartiality fails in its 
application to various identity considerations. 
With regard to the content of the argument advanced by merit-based 
or impaiiiality proponents, it fails on two accounts. Insofar as there is 
one standard of knowing viz a viz uniform treatment under the rule of 
law, the question arises: what standard is being used? More aptly, which 
standard is being used? Impaiiiality is not in itself impartial. It begs a 
reference point that is paiiial to those who set the standard. Inasmuch as 
the proponents of the impartiality doctrine dismiss considerations based 
on race and gender because they are social constructs, the impartial 
standard is also constructed. To advance the claim that race, for instance, 
is a social construct is to make an epistemological claim that what it 
means to be associated with a particular race is not innate. How I 
understand what 'blackness' means is not innate to being black. Social 
constructionist theory suggests that those associations and conclusions 
are learned. However, what the proponent of impartiality fails to recog-
nize is that the impaiiial standard is likewise not innate and not univer-
sal. In reference to the color-blind approach, John Powell argues: 
This colorblind position attempts to apply the late- and post-modernist 
insight of constructivism, but it wishes to limit this understanding to 
race. And there lies the error. The constructionist position is that all 
reality, including all concepts, are socially constructed.28 
Respecting gender-neutrality, Mackinnon suggests" ... women are 
measured according to our correspondence with man, our equality 
judged by our proximity to his measure."29 Surely what it means to be a 
man is neither innate nor universal. Rather it is socially constructed. 
Thus the standard is substantively dictated by the prevailing status quo 
and, therefore, not unquestionably impartial. 
Moreover, a necessary condition to this account of knowledge is that 
only one standard and one claim to knowledge can be maintained. Given 
that the impartial standard is contingent upon the prevailing dominant 
view, adherence to the standard must be strict. Otherwise the equality 
28 J.A. Powell, "The Colorblind Multiracial Dilemma: Racial Categories Reconsidered" 31 
U.S.FL.R 789 at 791. 
29 Supra note 23 at 34. 
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principle of'sameness' would be compromised. The impartial trajectory 
thrives on the preservation of a principle that is limited to what the 
prevailing status quo deems as 'merited' and what is merited is dictated 
by its similarity to the status quo. Thus, by limiting itself to sameness, 
the impartiality doctrine fails to recognize those instances that require 
examination and validation of difference and that difference does not 
necessarily mean 'unmerited'. The impartialist, for fear of loosing an 
objective standard, must ignore 'difference'. Otherwise the standard 
becomes subjective and lacks meaning. 
Use of the impartial standard resulted in courts holding that legisla-
tion denying appropriate consideration for pregnant women did not 
infringe the right to equality by reason of sex as the legislation had no 
application to women who were not pregnant. 30 Here the distinction 
between pregnant women and non-pregnant women is not the same as 
that between women and men. Non-pregnant women are the same as 
men and are thus treated equally. Dissimilar treatment is only warranted 
for pregnant women, not for non-pregnant women. Implicitly the courts 
dete1mined a woman's claim to equality by a male standard, and only by 
a male standard. 
The sameness standard is not limited to gender identity. It manifests 
itself in disability discourse as well. For instance, Dianne Pothier, a law 
professor who is visually disabled, recounts an incident from her days as 
a law student where her 'difference' was ignored.31 She describes a 
mooting exercise whereby she had to rely very heavily on her notes, 
lowering her head almost to the table to read the notes and then raising 
her head to speak. Her evaluator gave her 9/10 on the substance of her 
presentation and 4/10 for the presentation. Reflecting on the experience, 
Pothier states: 
I do not pretend that my presentation was a very good one in terms of 
style I was clearly relying too heavily on notes for it to be a strong 
presentation. But what is worth noting is what made the difference 
between a poor performance and a failing one. What is problematic 
30 Bliss v. A.G. Canada [1973] 1 S.C.R., later overturned by Brooks v. Can. Safeway [ 1987] 1 
S.C.R. 1219 in Canada and General Electric v. Gilbert. 429 U.S. 125 ( 1976), later overturned 
by Newport News Shipbuilding and D1:v Dock v. EEOC. 462 U.S. 669 (1983) in the United 
States. 
31 D. Pothier, "Miles To Go: Some Personal Reflections on the Social Constrnction of 
Disability" (May 1992) 14 Dalhousie L. J. 527. 
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from my perspective was the fact that my performance was judged as 
grossly substandard because I was being assessed on an able bodied 
standard. 32 
Despite its claim to equality, impartiality methodically results in the 
hierarchical allocation of privilege.33 Insofar as the impaitiality doctrine 
precludes recognition of difference, by application it contributes to 
economic, social and political disparities. In other words, impartiality 
commits itself to the eradication of that which is deemed a social 
construct. In doing so, categorical distinctions, which may be necessary 
to discern hann to subordinated populations and to direct political 
solutions to address such subordination,34 are prohibited. The imposi-
tion of the 'sameness' standard onto a prevalent hierarchical system 
results in the advantaging of some and the disadvantaging of others. 
Existing social injustices remain unaddressed and the hierarchy of privi-
lege is preserved. 
Examples include the preclusion of "special accommodations made 
for disabled people, women and others historically treated as differ-
ent."35 As a condition of granting full time employment, Simpsons-
Sears Retail required sales clerks to work Friday evenings and two of 
three Saturdays. Fridays and Saturdays are considered highly profitable 
selling times for the retail industry. The Supreme Court of Canada held 
that the uniform application of this condition to all full time sales clerks 
was in fact discriminatory.36 In particular, the case presented a situation 
where a sales clerk of a certain creed, a Seventh Day Adventist, was 
disadvantaged by the uniform application of the condition as she was 
excluded from full time employment considerations upon becoming a 
follower of that creed. On the other hand, methodically imposing the 
impartial standard to law school admission by the courts have resulted in 
the demise of several affinnative action programs in the United States. 
In one case a white student who was denied admission to first year law at 
University of Texas School of Law claimed that the School did not make 
an offer to admit her because of the School's affinnative action program 
32 Ibid at 532. 
33 Supra note 26 at 153 and Supra note 28 at 793. 
34 Supra note 26 at 155. 
35 Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1990) at 146. 
36 0.H.R. C. & Theresa 0 'Malley v. Simpsons-Sears, [ 1985] 2 S.C.R. 536. 
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which benefited African-Americans and Mexican-Americans.37 The 
Fifth Circuit court held that race could not be used, even in a multiplicity 
of factors in law school admissions. The court maintained that to con-
tinue to include race as a consideration in law school admission would 
exacerbate the already existing preferential treatment of certain groups 
over others. Thus the court concluded that ending racism entails treating 
all applicants the same. To put an end to affirmative action programs 
does not equalize opportunity between blacks and whites. Rather this 
'impartialist' strategy exacerbates prevailing inequities. For instance, 
research has suggested that the number of black law students would 
significantly drop in the absence of affirmative action programs.38 
Finally, an individual's experience of economic, political or social 
subordination and exclusion39 is devalued by the impartiality doctrine. 
Provided that only one account of knowledge is sustained and that 
claims of' difference' prohibited, the experience of exclusion and subor-
dination cannot be acknowledged. To acknowledge such experiences 
would compromise the impartialist's singular claim to knowledge. This 
is accomplished by the application of two techniques. First, because the 
impmiialist views categories as divisive, the grounds whereby catego-
ries are formed are the source of inequality. Powell suggests that impar-
tiality assumes "that the major race problem in our society is race itself, 
rather than racism. "40 Second, impmiiality adopts an ahistorical ap-
proach.41 It "undermines whatever past acknowledgement of difference 
there had been without producing social and political inclusion."42 
Concluding its judgment, the Fifth Circuit court in Hopwood asserted: 
In summary, we hold that the University of Texas School of Law may 
not use race as a factor in deciding which applicants to admit in order 
17 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5'" Cir.) 1996, cert. Denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 ( 1996). 
18 L. F. Wightman," The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admissions" (1997) 72 
N.Y.U.L.Rev.1 
19 This is borrowed from the definition of racism in Richard F. Devlin, "Towards An/Other 
Legal Education: Some Critical and Tentative Proposals to Confront Racism of Modern Legal 
Education" (1989) 38 U.N.B.LJ 89 at 90."Racism can be conceived of as a conscious or 
unconscious, personal or institutional, belief ideoloy or practice that, in response to a person or 
group's racial origins, has as its purpose or effect, the cultural or economic subordination/ 
exclusion of that person or group." 
411 Supra note 28 at 793. 
41 Supra note 26 at 153. 
42 Supra note 35 at 146. 
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to achieve a diverse student body, to combat the perceived effects of a 
hostile environment at the law school, to alleviate the law school's 
poor reputation in the minority community, or to eliminate the present 
effects of past discrimination by actors other than the law school.43 
In sum the impartial trajectory presumes that identity is ascertained 
through merit and, that in tum, meritorious acts perform the task of 
adjusting social, political and economic inequities. However, the com-
plex nature of identity as well as the various epistemological claims that 
follow are ignored by the impartial trajectory. It fails as an equality 
mechanism in two ways: not only does it create and maintain a principle 
that disregards the specificity of lived experience, but the impartial 
trajectory perpetuates privileging a constructed paradigm over diverse 
claims to knowledge. 
Indeed, I was admitted to law school on my own merits, based on the 
'normal' merit evaluation for Dalhousie Law School. And I continue to 
work hard and do well based on my own efforts. Similarly, all other 
students are admitted to law school on their own meritorious acts. 
However, identity formation and identity epistemologies are far more 
complex and subtle than what the impartial trajectory offers. I shared my 
struggles with several professors in first year law with the goal of 
finding a professor who understood what I was going through and who 
could impart advice of how to deal with my struggle. Most of the 
professors failed to understand why I could not simply brush off the 
asserted assumptions from other students and professors. They did not 
understand the reason that these interactions were distressing to me. A 
typical response was "Why couldn't you just tell them that you were not 
accepted through the program and that you were accepted like every-
body else?" It was not so simple because at those particular moments 
and for days afterwards the inferences drawn about me solely on the 
basis of my skin color undermined what it means to be me. All my past 
and present accomplishments which infom1ed me of my own identity 
were invalidated when professors and students expressed to me that they 
43 Supra note 37 at 962. The court also stated, " The use of race, in and of itself, to choose 
students simply achieves a student body that looks different. Such a criterion is no more 
rational on its own tenns than would be choices based upon physical size or bloodtype of 
applicants" at 945. Clearly the court here disregards how race has been used in historically 
significant ways to oppress and exclude, and this dynamic may significantly affect the way 
people of color experience the world. 
RECONSTRUCTING IDENTITY: ... 153 
thought that because of my skin color I could not have been accepted to 
law school on my own merits. Their claims were irrefutable at the time 
because it is not a matter of merely suggesting "No, I was not accepted 
through the IB&M program." 
A validating response must explicitly demonstrate that their 'impar-
tial' assessment of my circumstances and of me was substantively 
constructed by what they think it means to be black and in law school 
and it was imposed onto me. How does a black woman explain to a 
white man that what he has just said not only reveals what he really 
thinks of her but also of all other black people without being perceived 
as confrontational? More significantly, how do the images described in 
the previous sentence play out for the impartialist? Are the merits 
extracted from her position without regard to the context or to the labels 
used in the sentence to identify the dynamic? Indeed, my experiences 
are invalidated by the impartialist trajectory. 
2. Identity through Categories 
(i) Same yet Different 
The traditional alternative to impartiality is categorization. In percep-
tion, thought, action, and speech there is nothing more fundamental than 
grouping things according to resemblance and contrast.44 In an ongoing 
process, we observe and conclude that "things within a category are 
relevantly similar [and] they are collectively differentiated from things 
outside the category."45 Thus categorization is a kind of essentialism 
where those things that are within a category share perceived fundamental 
qualities that make it sufficient and necessary for the thing to be consid-
ered as a thing of that type. The protection against discrimination on 
enumerated and analogous grounds in human rights legislation46 and in 
the Charte1A7 is illustrative categorization as a tool in law. 
44 Supra note 2 at 5. 
45 N. Iyer, "Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social Identity" ( 1994) 19 
Queen's L. J. 179 at 182-183. 
46 Federally, Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C 1985, c.H-6 [hereinafter CHRA] and Human 
Rights Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214 as a provincial example. 
47 S. 15( I) states: Eve1y individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability. 
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For instance, Mackinnon suggests that categorization, "is the only 
place in mainstream equality doctrine where you get to identify as a 
woman and not have to mean giving up all claim to equal treatment ... "48 
Such legal protection is allowable because categorization accepts that 
there can be multiple accounts of the world. The categorical trajectory 
works from two premises. First, insofar as there are multiple accounts of 
the world, categorization delineates according to shared perceptions and 
from dissimilar experiences. Second, the various claims grounded in 
similarity and difference are regarded by the categorical trajectory as valid 
and equal claims to knowledge. To identify as a woman implies some-
thing different from what it means to identify as a man. While implica-
tions may differ, to identify as a woman or to identify as a man both 
presume equality. Identity, then, inheres in similarity and difference. 
(ii) Weaknesses in the Categorical Framework 
Although the categorical trajectory attempts to overcome several of 
the shortcomings of the impartial trajectory, the following analysis 
reveals inherent problems with characterizations of similarity and differ-
ence. 
In the process of assigning identities to individuals according to 
similarities and differences, genuine perceptions of those similarities 
and differences must occur. For instance, making distinctions based on 
race, gender, (dis)ability and sexual orientation involves grouping ac-
cording to what is perceived to be inherent to each group. Blacks are 
grouped together because they share similarities in skin pigmentation, 
African ancest1y and, arguably, certain experiences. Grouping also in-
volves the determination of what is distinctly unlike each category. 
Those whose skin pigmentation and related experiences differ are cat-
egorized differently from one another. Often commensurate with this 
process of demarcation, distinctions become exaggerated such that cat-
egorization is no longer limited to the reflection of the initial difference. 
It often produces imagined difference, which results in labels, stereo-
types and stigma. Because categorization results in the validation of 
difference, individual members of a category are themselves regarded as 
different and those real and imagined differences are attributed to one's 
48 Supra note 23 at 39. 
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identity. Thus categorization is problematic for the reason that in form-
ing real and conceived differences about categories, identity ceases to be 
a meaningful expression of the individual. Individual identity is ignored 
as assumptions about categorization are accentuated. 
An example of the aforementioned problem is caught in Langston 
Hughes' essay "Who's Passing for Who?"49 One evening, Hughes 
encounters a friend in Harlem who is accompanying three white friends 
(a bachelor, husband and wife) who are visiting from out of state. He 
decides to have a drink with them. As they are conversing, a brown 
skinned man hits a blonde woman. One of the friends from out of state 
intervenes in the altercation yelling 'Keep your hands off the white 
woman'. However, he immediately apologizes to the man when he is 
informed that the woman is not white. He is told that she is the wife of 
the brown skinned man. He states to the man "I thought she was a white 
woman." Later he explains to Hughes and his friends, "I didn't mean to 
be butting in if they were all the same race." 
Once the other members of the party reproach the man for his racist 
attitude, he leaves. The remaining party, which included Hughes, his 
friend and the married couple, began discussing the phenomenon of 
blacks that pass for white. The wife interrupted the discussion by stating 
that she and her husband were quite familiar with passing for white, as 
they had been doing it for a number of years. After the initial surprise, 
Hughes states, "[A]ll at once we dropped our professionally self-con-
scious "Negro" manners, became natural, ate fish and talked and kidded 
freely like colored folks do when there are no white folks around." At 
the end of the evening, as the couple was whisked away by a taxi, the 
wife leaned out the window and exclaimed, "Listen, boys! I hate to 
confuse you again. But, to tell the truth, my husband and I aren't really 
coloured at all. We're white. We thought that we just kid you by passing 
as coloured ... " 
What is significant about this story is that it tells the reader only one 
thing about the characters. The story does not tell us who is black or 
white. It does not explain to the reader the reasons behind the bachelor's 
behaviour or what the married woman and man were like as individuals. 
Rather the story informs us only about the characters' assumptions of 
49 L. Hughes, "Who's Passing for Who? in Akiba Sullivan Harper, ed. Short Stories Langston 
Hughes (New York: Hill and Wang, 1963) 170. 
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others according to racial classification. Upon reading the stmy, we 
know with certainty how each character reacts and behaves once they 
have discerned to what race the other characters belonged. The story 
does nothing to help us to be acquainted with the characters' identities. 
This story is a challenge to the validity of the categorical trajecto1y in 
that it demonstrates how categorization based on perceived difference 
can result in distorted assumptions by others. 
Insofar as identity inheres in categorization, it is epistemologically 
untenable for identity to participate in more than one category. Categori-
zation dismisses a multifaceted account of knowledge thereby forcing 
one to choose among categories, create others, or remain invisible. This 
occurs in three steps. First, a characteristic or a bundle of characteristics 
is deemed to be intrinsic to a group. Martha Minow suggests that by 
pigeonholing people into sharply distinguished categories based on 
selected facts and features renders difference intrinsic to the group in 
that difference becomes a trait of the group.50 Second, those selected 
facts and features become the group's identifier, "which is regarded as 
wholly constitutive of that group's social identity."51 Third the group's 
social identity is attributed to the individual's identity. This attribution 
precludes recognition that an individual is not constitutive solely of the 
group's personality. Thus difference within groups is ignored, which 
contributes to tension among groups. 52 
Moreover, as an equality principle, categorization suffers from in-
herent contradiction. To classify one's self as like or unlike another 
according to group affiliation is to adopt a particular approach to per-
ceiving and explaining the world.53 Categories are presumed to exist 
independently from one's perception and thus we react passively to 
them by merely sorting experiences, perceptions and problems through 
them.54 They go unchallenged. Similarities between members and non-
members of a categmy are suppressed, while intra-group differences are 
ignored. Engaging in this process, Minow suggests that, "we identify 
one thing as unlike the others, we are dividing the world; we use our 
50 Supra note 35 at 53. 
51 Supra note 45 at 191. 
52 K. Crenshaw "Mapping The Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, And Violence 
Against Women Of Colour" (July 1991) 43 STN.L.R 1241at1243. 
53 Supra note 23 at 34. 
54 Supra note 35 at 3. 
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language to exclude, to distinguish-to discriminate."55 Thus where dif-
ferentiation is analogous to discrimination, categorization is in itself 
discriminatory. 
In her examination of the Supreme Court of Canada Mossop deci-
sion,56 Nitya Iyer recognizes that this is a problem.57 The father of Brian 
Mossop's partner had died. Mossop applied for bereavement leave 
pursuant to his collective agreement in order to attend the funeral. 
Bereavement leave, under the agreement, applied to the death of certain 
family members. However, his employer denied him leave. The reason 
for denial was that since Mossop's partner was a man, his partner's 
father was not within the meaning of family member. Pursuant to 
section 3 of the Canadian Human Rights Act,58 Mossop alleged dis-
crimination on the grounds of family status. Sexual orientation was not 
an enumerated ground in the CHRA at the time. The Supreme Court 
dismissed the case for the reason that none of the protected grounds in 
the CHRA applied to him. Iyer notes that Mossop may have chosen to 
characterize his claim as discrimination based on family status because 
this is how he may have experienced the discrimination, with his sexual 
orientation secondary to that experience. Iyer concludes that Mossop 
fell through the cracks, "because his experience of discrimination on the 
basis of a social characteristic [did] not correspond to the dominant 
social understanding of that characteristic. "59 
Insofar as categorization contributes to tensions among groups and the 
demand to choose among groups, the experience of a woman who is 
disabled provides an excellent example of the tension between the disabil-
ity movement and feminism, and how she opts to remain invisible: 
55 Ibid. 
For the disabled feminist, neither the disability nor the feminist move-
ment fully address her concerns. In the disability movement the dis-
abled feminist has to contend with sexism. In the feminist movement 
she must contend with colleagues who do not understand her disabil-
ity-based political concerns. In response to this predicament, she far 
too often opts out of the political process altogether.<'0 
56 Canada (Attomey-General) v. Mossop, [ 1993] I S.C.R. 554. 
57 Supra note 45 at 194-199. 
58 Supra note 46. 
59 Supra note 45 at 196. 
60 M. Blackwell-Stratton, M. Breslin, A. Byrnne Mayerson, and S. Bailey, "Smashing Icons: 
Disabled Women and the Disability and Women's Movements" in M. Fine and A. Asch, eds. 
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The social construction of categories implicitly entails the use of a 
dominant referent to organize experiences and perceptions and frame 
them within a category such that it is distinguishable from all other 
categories, including the dominant one. This becomes problematic in 
two instances: when the distinction from the dominant group is used 
detrimentally against other groups and when the dominant members of 
the group solely define a group. Similar to the impartial method, catego-
rization results in the hierarchical allocation of privilege where the 
dominant group remains unchallenged. 
In the first instance, Iyer suggests that distinction is not only about 
difference. 61 It is also an expression of hierarchies and the asse1iion of 
power. This concern is evidenced in the manner that libraries are orga-
nized. While browsing in the library, Packwood describes his realization 
that the usefulness of the library extends beyond the services that it 
provides. The experience exposed, "a map of power, a guide through the 
ordering principles by which power places ideas and experience into 
categories and rigidifies knowledge."62 He was appalled to find that sex 
crimes, homosexuality and prostitution were together. Packwood also 
observes the hierarchical implications of categorization. He remarks that 
under the heading 'Sexual behaviour and attitudes', the category of girl 
follows the category of boy, the category of woman follows the category 
of man, and a catch-all category is tacked on at the end that conflates the 
aged, handicapped, and sick. 63 In the second instance, the feminist 
movement illustrates how the perspectives of the dominant members of 
a group form the identity of the group, ignoring other member's con-
cerns. bell hooks argues: 
[W]hite women who dominate feminist discourse today rarely ask the 
question whether or not their perspective on women's reality is true to 
the lived experiences of women as a collective group. Nor are they 
aware of the extent to which their perspectives reflect race and class 
biases, although there has been a greater awareness of biases in recent 
years.64 
Women with Disabilities: Essays in Psychology, Culture and Politics (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1988) 306 at 307. 
61 Supra note 45 at 185. 
62 N. Packwood, "Browsing the Apparatus: Homosexuality, Classification, Power/Knowl-
edge" (1993) 28 Border/Lines 19 at 20. 
63 Ibid at 22. 
64 b. hooks, Feminist TheOJy: From Margin to Center (United States: South End Press, 1989) 
at 3. 
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In sum, the categorical trajectory is attractive in that it recognizes 
some of the identity considerations that the impartiality doctrine ig-
nores. It accepts the premise that the world is knowable from various 
sources and that true equality recognizes and celebrates difference. 
However, the categorical trajectory encounters numerous problems. To 
group individuals in accordance with perceived similarities and differ-
ences discriminates; it contributes to the stereotyping of groups and 
individuals; it derogates from the value of inter-group associations; it 
creates and maintains a hierarchy of privilege; it overlooks intra-group 
concerns. 
Once the black Nova Scotian law students realized that I was not 
admitted through the IB&M program and that I choose not to follow 
their advice regarding 'those racist white people', invitations to events 
were less forthcoming. I did not fit into what they determined it meant to 
be black in Dalhousie Law School. To include me in their activities 
would not allow them to p01iray a united front against others. I exhibited 
very little of the traits that they thought a black law student in Nova 
Scotia should exhibit. I sat with white students in class and I socialized 
with them. Often I was one of two black students at law school social 
events. At a meeting of the Dalhousie Black Law Student Association 
(DBLSA), I wanted to know how a member could run for one of the 
elected positions. I was told that a black student who is not from Nova 
Scotia could not run for any of the positions. This restriction was 
understandable to me because I can understand that someone from the 
outside of the community cannot always voice the concerns pertinent to 
the community. However sometime after that meeting, I was dismayed 
to hear that in selecting students to sit on various committees in the law 
school, the DBLSA members objected to a particular black student's 
membership on a committee on the grounds that "he could not possibly 
address our concerns, he attended private school." 
The imposition of what it means to be black was not limited to my 
experiences with black students. Although this example does not di-
rectly relate to law school, it is useful because of what it illustrates. A 
white male friend from law school shared with me his budding interest 
in a woman and he asked me what I thought of her. I told him that I 
thought she was pretty but I thought that he could do better. My friend 
responded to me by saying, "Isn't that funny? I would have thought that 
as a minority, who would never be considered in the rating system, you 
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would object to using a rating system yourself as do most minorities." 
Both examples highlight the dangers of categorization and the reason 
that categorization limits my claim to knowledge. What does it mean to 
be black? What does it mean to be a 'minority'? Does 'blackness' and 
the status of being a 'minority' mean specific social attributes and 
expressions? Whenever someone calls me a 'minority' I am baffled 
because the only thing that I can discern that makes me a minority is the 
color of my skin, not how I vote, my citizenship, my educational 
aspirations, nor my family and personal life. 
IV. A NEW APPROACH: A FRAMEWORK OF DIFFERENCE 
Stemming from the foregoing analysis, it is evident that an account 
of identity must be comprised of at least two features. First, identity is 
the consequence of social constrnction. Stripped of historical perspec-
tive, cultural influence, political energy, and philosophical musings, 
there is nothing that is essential to identity. Identity cannot exist in the 
absence of meaning and meaning is empty without perspective. Yet 
social constrnctivism does not imply that identity is not knowable. Nor 
does it imply that it is insignificant. It implies that identity is knowable 
and that is acquires its significance in the social world. Second, identity 
is multiplicitous, drawing upon knowledge and experience from several 
worlds. The meaning of a subject's identity is not limited to one cat-
egory nor is it solely derived from merit-worthy acts. Rather, identity is 
an expression of acts, context and self. Given these considerations, an 
account of identity must be expressive of its contingency as well as its 
dynamic ability to derive meaning from several worlds. However, in 
light of these considerations, an inquiry into whether there can be a 
comprehensive account of identity arises. It is my view that, given the 
unique and conditional nature of identity, an all-encompassing account 
of identity cannot be acquired. Therefore the following analysis is 
offered as a tool to facilitate an improved and refined understanding of 
identity, how it is constructed, and the derivation of equality therefrom. 
Having explicitly delineated these features, the analysis in Part II 
also warned that regardless of how identity is constrned, the hierarchical 
allocation of privilege remains invariable. Thus an account of identity 
must also guard against, implicitly or explicitly, treating identity as 
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justification for subordination. Part II demonstrated that 'difference' is 
the means whereby identity is labelled and subordinated. Considering 
this unfortunate use of difference, the analysis adopted in the present 
section shall navigate through feminist 'difference discourse' in order to 
provide a functional account of identity. 
1. The Foundation 
(i) Anti-Essentialism 
John Powell a former colleague of mine and also the legal affairs 
director of the ACLU - tells a story of going to a Thanksgiving dinner 
with his son, Fon. John and Fon are vegetarians. The host said to Fon, 
"This is the regular dressing and the other is the vegetarian dressing." 
John said to the host, "No, there is vegetarian dressing and there is 
meat-eater's dressing, but neither one of them is regular dressing."65 
Trina Grillo's example demonstrates how anti-essentialism func-
tions as a theory of anti-subordination. The essentialist position entails 
that the intelligibility of things, and in particular the experience of being 
a member of a group, "requires that there be one complete, consistent, 
comprehensive and coherent description of reality."66 The presumption 
that there is one coherent representative account of a particular category 
disregards difference within the category thereby reinforcing exclusion 
and the devaluation of other's experiences. Thus anti-essentialists ne-
gate this conception by asserting intra-group difference whereby race, 
gender, class, sexuality combine in historically specific ways to define 
identity and to explain experiences of discrimination.67 For instance, it 
recognizes that the experience of a white woman dealing with a white 
man raising a white child may not the same experience of a black 
woman dealing with a white man raising a mixed child.68 To suggest 
that there is one representative description of woman that is essential to 
65 T. Grillo, "Anti-Essential ism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master's House" 
( 1 995) Berkeley Women's law Journal 16 at 20. Grillo notes that the story also appears in 
Charles Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Speech on Campus, ( 1990) Duke 
L.J. 431 at 473. 
66 C. Spinosa and H.L.Dreyfuss, "Two Kinds of Antiessentialism and Their Consequences" 
(Summer 1996) Critical Inquiry 735 at 736. 
67 S. H. Razack, Looking White People in The Eye: Gender, Race, and Culture in Courtrooms 
and Classrooms (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998) at 157. 
""Supra note 65 at 19, the example is altered. 
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both women in this example would exclude the expression of one of 
these experiences and the critical role that specificity plays in their lives 
thereby privileging one over the other. 
Returning to the Thanksgiving dinner illustration, the 'regular' 
dressing is considered to be the paradigm whereas the 'vegetarian' 
dressing is regarded as the deviation from that paradigm and is therefore 
accorded the value of 'other'. Anti-essentialism challenges this type of 
classification by reminding us that identity is a social construction 
grounded in the specificity oflived experience thereby rendering no one 
account of knowledge to rightly represent all accounts of knowledge or 
to be considered as the dominant account of knowledge. 
Furthermore, Sherene Razack suggests that anti-essentialism is not 
limited to the goal of inclusion because the implication remains that 
subordinated groups must conform to a prescribed standard. 69 Insofar as 
there is recognition that there is no essential categorization, anti-essen-
tialism guides the subject to ask how he or she is implicated in the 
subordination of others. 70 By re-framing difference in this manner, 
Razack asserts that we examine our own complicity in the subordination 
of others and "only then can we ask questions about how we are 
understanding differences and for what purpose."71 
Anti-essentialism helps me gain a deeper understanding of my situa-
tion, in that both the black students and the white students used an 
essentialist conception of what they perceived blackness to mean. For 
instance, the IB&M program is cast as the deviation from the entrenched 
norm of the 'regular' admission process. Those admitted through the 
IB&M program and anyone who is sufficiently similar to those admitted 
through the IB&M program are deemed as 'other'. Anti-essentialism 
entails that we expose how we are implicated in the creation of what is 
different. The sole consideration that renders the IB&M program differ-
ent or the individuals perceived to be associated with the program as 
different lies in our own construction of difference and the imposition of 
that construction. The anti-essentialist approach reveals that the 'regu-
lar' admissions program reflects a certain constructed paradigm, which 
69 Supra note 67 at 159. 
70 Supra note 64 at 159. 
71 Ibid at 170. 
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should not be valued over others. Accordingly, the 'regular' admissions 
program can be dismantled and re-constructed. 
(ii) lntersectionality 
Whenever something like this happens in discussion of gender and 
race, I cannot separate them. I do not know, when something like this 
happens to me, when it is happening to me because I am an Indian or 
when it is happening to me because I am an Indian woman.72 
Patricia Monture, here, recounts a painful experience where she was 
affected by a discussion she was observing. The discussion was on the 
subject of whether the sole issue in that discussion should be "racism, 
not gender."73 Monture quite candidly reveals that race and gender 
cannot be separated in a discussion regarding discrimination because 
this is not an accurate reflection of how she understands herself and how 
she experiences her pain. Monture's frustration is indisputable insofar as 
one's understanding of one's self is entirely specific. Thus, in adopting 
her reasoning, she need not stop at identifying herself as an Indian 
woman. Monture can easily continue to define herself as an able-bodied, 
Canadian-Indian, middle-class, heterosexual woman, for example. 
However, other authors warn that "the full implications of the infi-
nite regress into specificity"74 should be addressed. For instance, Jenni-
fer Nedelsky suggests that categorization is necessary "for both political 
theory and legal reasoning as we know it."75 Yet the infinite regress into 
specificity threatens the usefulness of categories. Elizabeth Spelman 
asks whether it is "possible to give the things women have in common 
their full significance without thereby implying that the differences 
among us are less important?"76 The implications of these concerns lie 
in the political and social effectiveness of categories where categories 
facilitate the expression of political will and, in tum, provide grounds for 
72 P.A. Monture, "Ka-Nin-Geh-Heh-Gah-E-Sah-Nonh-Tah-Gah" (1986) I C.J.W.L. 159 at 
167. 
73 Ibid at 166. 
74 J. Nedelsky, "Embodied Diversity and the Challenges to Law" (February, 1997) 42 McGill 
L.J. 91 at 98. 
75 Ibid at 97. 
76 E. V. Spelman Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1988) at 3. Although I mention this concern in this section, it is equally a 
concern for anti-essentialism. 
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the sharing of power. If categories collapse and voices are grounded in 
specificity, the fear is that the credence of race or gender discourse, for 
example, is forfeited because it becomes impossible to talk about op-
press10n. 
In her works regarding discrimination experienced by African-
American women, Kimberle Crenshaw offers a method that can be used 
here to reconcile the effectiveness of categories as social constructs with 
the genuine need to account for specificity.77 Crenshaw's research ex-
posed the complexities of discrimination faced by African-American 
women. She claims that categorical associations inadequately address 
the experience of specificity in the lives of such women and, conse-
quently, discrimination laws fail to recognize and remedy discrimina-
tion experienced by African-American women. By ignoring intra-group 
difference, the way racism, classisism, and sexism intersect in the lived 
experience of discrimination and oppression is suppressed. Thus she 
offers the theory of intersectionality, not as a new comprehensive theory 
of identity, but as a method that highlights, "the need to account for 
multiple grounds of identity when considering how the social world is 
constructed."78 Deeply embedded in this assertion is the recognition that 
insofar as the social world is cmTently constructed in terms of subordi-
nation and exclusion, intersectionality provides the means with which to 
deconstruct dominance. 
Alexandra Natapoff provides an interesting illustration of 
intersectionality.79 He explicitly uses Crenshaw's research regarding 
African-American women to reconstruct the characterization of the 
oppression and discrimination experienced by deaf children who come 
from non-English speaking homes. Natapoff cites instances where the 
failure to teach English to deaf children whose mother-tongues are 
Hispanic and whose homes are non-English "disrupts home life and the 
children's ability to communicate with their families and thus to 
leam."80 To prioritize deafness over bilingualism, therefore, does not 
77 Supra note 52 and K. Crenshaw, "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist 
Politics" (1989) U. Chi. Legal F. 139. 
78 Supra note 52 at 1245. 
79 A. Natapoff, "Anatomy of a Debate: Intersectionality and Equality for Deaf Children from 
Non-English Speaking Homes" 24:2 Journal of Law and Education 271. 
80 Ibid at 276. 
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account for the lived experience of these children. In exposing how 
deafness and bilingualism interface, he refutes claims that suggest that 
deafness is the most significant factor in organizing an educational 
strategy for the children. Natapoff suggests that "these children repre-
sent the paradigmatic case of intersectionality. "81 He states: 
They must navigate their way through society with heavily culturally 
loaded traits, each triggering complex and potentially conflicting legal 
obligations on the part of educators and government officials, each 
with potentially devastating or beneficial results for the child and his 
or her notion of self. 82 
My first-year law experience is another illustration of the effective-
ness of using intersectionality to reveal the complexity of identity, and 
how intra-group interaction reorganizes how we perceive the world. 
Difference was emphasized in those interactions. Difference was associ-
ated with the perceptions of the colour of my skin. Intersectionality 
demonstrates that my experience was, indeed, related to perception 
regarding the colour of my skin; however, the experience was also 
contextually specific to law school, and in particular, to Dalhousie Law 
School. Fmihe1more, if the moments of interaction were reconstructed 
so that my skin colour did not supersede all else, those students may 
have come to understand that my identity is grounded in an intersection 
of a multitude of categories and that, perhaps, we share more in common 
that we what we do not. 
Having defined intersectionality, it is worthwhile to make explicit 
that intersectionality forbids reductionism for everyone, not solely for 
subordinated groups. Thus, through the lens of intersectionality, the 
complex identities of white women or white men cannot be neatly 
separated and prioritized. Their identities too must be deconstructed to 
reflect and account for their lived specificity. Grillo suggests that "for a 
black woman, race and gender are not separate, but neither are they for 
white women."83 Thus intersectionality provides a mechanism to dis-
mantle subordination that recognises the universal manifestation of 
constructionism. 
81 Ibid at 278. 
82 Ibid at 278. 
83 Supra note 65 at 19. 
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In order to deconstruct dominance through intersectionality, 
Crenshaw asks the reader to first recognize that the identity groups in 
which the individual finds him or herself are coalitions. Although self-
identification happens, she is implicitly arguing that categorization is 
not necessarily individual driven. Rather the individual is located to a 
particular group whereby the members thereof coalesce to articulate the 
needs of the group. Recognizing the function of categories as coalitions 
clarifies the value of intersectionality. It provides the foundation to 
reconceptualize categories as a means for political and social change. 
Insofar as "we all stand at multiple intersections of our fragmented legal 
selves,''84 categories can be reformulated that allow for interconnect-
edness among groups. Crenshaw argues that 
(t]hrough an awareness of intersectionality, we can better acknowl-
edge and ground the differences among us and negotiate the means by 
which these differences will find expression in constructing group 
politics. 85 
By reinforcing the interconnecteness of groups, intersectionality can 
provide the means to dismantle power structures because subjects stop 
organising the world into categories dictated by the dominant culture.86 
2. A Framework Proposed 
Intersectionality and anti-essentialism both constitute the same cri-
tique, however they commence "from two different starting points."87 
Anti-essentialism begins by questioning essentialist approaches to simi-
larity and difference whereas intersectionality begins with the recogni-
tion of the way the social world is constructed and how it imports 
meaning into the specificity of lived experiences. Both critiques offer a 
theory of difference where difference is not relegated under the label of 
'other'. Rather both critiques suggest that difference is constructed 
among subjects, that difference is not ascertainable free of social rela-
tionships. In recognizing that difference is not intrinsic to the person, we 
begin to see that we are complicit in the construction of difference. 
84 Supra note 65 at 18. 
85 Supra note 52 at 1281. 
86 Supra note 65 at 20 
87 Supra note 65 at 17. 
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Martha Minow suggests that in the 'dilemma of difference', we are 
complicit in 'making the difference' .88 She believes 
[ d]ifference can be understood not as intrinsic but as a function of 
relationships, as a comparison drawn between an individual and a 
norm that can be stated and evaluated.89 .•• A difference stance would 
treat the problem of difference as embedded in the 
relationships ... making all.. .part of the problem.90 
For example, Minow asks us to re-think certain cases. In Eaton v. Brant 
County Board of Education91 the parents of a twelve year old child, 
Emily, with cerebral palsy asked the Supreme Court to set aside the 
tribunal's decision to place the child in a special education class. They 
grounded their claim in s.15 of the Charter, alleging discrimination 
based on disability. The court reviewed the tribunal's findings of fact. 
They found that Emily was unable to speak. She was incapable of using 
sign language meaningfully and she had no established alternative com-
munication system. Although she used a wheelchair frequently, Emily 
was capable of bearing her own weight to walk a short distance with the 
aid of a walker. Since kindergarten Emily was placed in a class with 
other students her own age on a trial basis. During that time a full-time 
educational assistant was assigned to the classroom to attend Emily's 
special needs. 
However, "a number of concerns arose as to the appropriateness of 
[Emily's] continued placement in a regular classroom."92 In fact, the 
Tribunal had considered "the testimony presented on the subject of the 
"parallel curriculum" approach in which an adapted curriculum is deliv-
ered in the regular classroom setting."93 However, the Tribunal con-
cluded that 
[ e ]xperience demonstrates that in practice, 'parallel curriculum' ben-
efits the receiver when it is realistically parallel. But when a curricu-
lum is so adapted and modified for an individual that the similarity -
the parallelism is objectively unidentifiable, the adaptation becomes 
a mere mtifice and serves only to isolate the student.94 
88 Supra note 35. 
89 Ibid at 81. 
90 Supra note 35 at 84. 
91 [ 1997] I S.C.R. 241. 
92 Ibid at paragraph 7. [Emphasis added] 
93 Ibid at paragraph I 7. [Emphasis added] 
94 Supra note 88 at paragraph I 7. 
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Using the 'best interests' of the child, the Court upheld the Tribunal's 
findings of fact and found that Emily's placement did not impose a 
disadvantage. Nor did it constitute the withholding of benefit or advan-
tage. The court held that the tribunal's decision was based solely on the 
determination of the child's best interests and upheld its decision to 
place Emily is a special education class. 
There is no doubt that both the tribunal and Emily's parents were 
attempting to seek the best educational forum for Emily. The tribunal 
reasoned that a class that can provide special accommodation would be 
the best alternative for Emily. To keep her in the mainstream class 
would merely hinder her learning and further stigmatize her. On the 
other hand, Emily's parents regarded her displacement to another class 
as stigmatizing. They were also concerned that being in a special educa-
tion class would compromise the quality of education that she would 
receive. 
However, Minow asks us to seek a third alternative, to realise how, 
in this context and through the myriad of relationships captured by this 
issue, difference was attributed to Emily. By doing this, the problem is 
assumed to be Emily's problem and, using Minow's analysis, both sides 
of this issue agreed on this point. They both situated the problem around 
the implied norm of abled students learning from a teacher, "rather than 
imagining a different nmm around which the entire classroom might be 
constructed."95 A third alternative to this issue would recognise that 
'difference' inheres in relations and not the subject. The goal of the 
teacher should be to construct a learning environment that would benefit 
all the children in the class thereby "resisting the temptation to treat the 
problem as belong to the 'different' child."96 
For instance, the learning environment can be dismantled and re-
structured such that the school itself involves all the children and staff, 
where 'difference' is not attributed to Emily (the 'other'). Based on the 
tribunal's findings of fact, Emily, dependent on a wheelchair and/or a 
walker, should not be restricted to a confined space. Emily's school 
environment could be designed where Emily and all the other students 
and staff have much space within which to move and learn.97 The 
95 Supra note 35 at 83. 
96 Ibid at 84. 
97 Both R. Byrns Curry and Christie Public School in the Ottawa area are elementary schools 
that function in a similar manner. 
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demands of the school could entail an open area concept where the 
school is circular. The library, which could be wheelchair accessible and 
open to all classrooms that border it, could be in the centre of the school. 
The classrooms could be designed such that all students can move 
around freely and are not limited to traditional use of desks. Considering 
that Emily and other students like her are challenged in the traditional 
sense of communication, the use of technology, as an easily manipulated 
means of communication can be integrated into the classroom. All 
students in the school could learn through technology. 
Structuring the school environment in a manner that reconstructs 
what is deemed to be the 'norm' diminishes, for all students and staff, 
the potency of the stigma of difference. Where the stigma of difference 
was institutionalized in both solutions that were proposed by the school 
and Emily's parents, the reconstructed norm becomes institutionalized 
such that the community becomes part of the solution. Yet, inclusion, 
here, is not the goal. Inclusion presupposes an entrenched norm from 
which the stigma of 'other' gains meaning. Inclusion would mean, 
therefore, including Emily in the 'regular' classroom environment. 
Rather, reconstructing the school environment, such that the 'norm' is 
exposed and re-evaluated through the function of community relation-
ships, brings to an end subordinating practices. Emily, in this environ-
ment, is recognised as different from some of the other students but she 
is not subordinated as other. 
A second example highlights how the re-conceptualisation of the 
nonn can begin to influence daily activities. Nedelsky explains how she 
has adopted a technique in her classroom to disrupt the nonn.98 She 
explained to her law students that in deciding which students to call on 
to comment she would call on them in the order that they raised their 
hands. However when a student who barely participates in class discus-
sion raises her hand, she gives the student priority. She was concerned 
that solely using the strategy of calling on students as they raised their 
hands would perpetuate the disproportionate participation of men.99 In 
recognising that difference inheres in relation and context, Nedelsky 
applied the same rule regardless of which class she taught. Thus, in her 
feminist theory class where more white women tend to participate more 
98 Supra note 74 at 111. 
99 Supra note 74 at 111. 
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than others in class discussions, she used this rnle to equalize participa-
tion of women of colour and men. Nedelsky exposed and evaluated the 
norm, which permitted her to reconstruct the learning environment in 
her classroom. In her example, she displaced difference. It was no longer 
ascribed to the student. Rather she involved the entire class in the act of 
exposing and evaluating how interactions construct difference. The 
classroom provided the forum where those interactions are evaluated 
and reconstructed such that the norm is altered, resulting in equality in 
that context. 
Finally, a significant aspect ofMinow's strategy is to reconstruct the 
norm. In order to do that the realisation that difference is not embedded 
in the subject is crucial. It implies that those structures and institutions 
currently in place function to subordinate because they are structured on 
the presumption that difference is found in the subject rather than being 
a function ofrelationships. Thus programs that are founded on 'accom-
modation' or 'benefit' in order to achieve equality objectives must 
account for their complicity in the 'dilemma of difference'. Minow 
suggests 
[s]olutions to dilemmas of difference cannot work if they redeposit the 
responsibility for redressing negative meanings of difference on the 
person who is treated as different. Solutions that emphasize individual 
responsibility run this danger, perhaps because most social institutions 
still define "the individual" in light of an unstated norm and degrade 
those who depart from that norm. 100 
In dismissing the constitutional validity of the affirmative action pro-
gram at the University of Michigan Law School, the United State 
District Court suggested alternative mechanisms for law school admis-
sion. 101 In accepting evidence on trial that suggested that the LSA T 
predicts success at law school and in the legal profession rather 
poorly, 102 Justice Friedman states: 
The law school seeks students who "have substantial promise for 
success in law school" and a strong likelihood of succeeding in the 
100 Supra note 35 at 93. 
101 Supra note 27 Grutter v. Regents of the University of Michigan et al. 
102 Justice Friedman quotes the correlation as within the range of 10% to 20% with law school 
grades and states that it does not predict success in the legal profession at all. 
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practice oflaw" one must wonder why the law school concerns itself at 
all with the applicant's LSAT score. 103 
Thus he suggests that the law school consider relaxing or eliminating the 
LSAT as a requirement for law school admissions. He further suggests 
that the law school should reduce its reliance on the student's GPA as 
well as reconsider its policy of preference for the children of alumni of 
the law school. Although Justice Friedman couches these suggestions in 
colour-blind rhetoric, in effect the suggestions would completely dis-
mantle the institutional presumption that difference is located in the 
subject. Highlighted in these suggestions is that the norm can be ex-
posed, re-evaluated and re-constructed. Institutions would no longer be 
complicit in subordination and stigmatization. Rather the world can be 
re-ordered with the view of terminating the hierarchical allocation of 
privilege. 
Specifically, for those law schools whose admission policies are 
two-fold, that the law school seeks to offer admission to students of high 
academic excellence and to be able to reflect members ofits community, 
the law school must move towards contextual post-categorical judge-
ments. In order to meet this objective, law school admission mecha-
nisms must be evaluated to expose how 'difference' is attributed to their 
students. For example the dichotomy between 'regular' admission and 
'special' admission to the extent that subordination occurs in the law 
school should be evaluated. The law school must, also, evaluate the 
integral role played by it in the construction of difference and subordina-
tion. 
An illustration of a reconstructed admission structure would involve 
the law school investing in a substantial commitment of time, resources 
and self-evaluation. The law school should be able to ask itself as well as 
its students questions that would expose the strengths and weaknesses of 
its admission procedure. This alternative admission procedure involves 
at least four steps, depending on how a particular law school adapts its 
admission procedures. First, the law school should articulate a profile of 
its ideal first year class. This process would not involve asking how 
many aboriginal or black students the school should admit. Rather, it 
involves the law school asking difficult questions about what it hopes to 
103 Supra note 27at 148. 
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achieve through its admission policies. A significant aspect of this 
question is for the law school to engage in deliberations with community 
members, faculty and students of what it means to be a member of a 
targeted community. For instance, what does a law school value about 
having a black law student as a member of its student body? What does 
it mean to be a black student? The law school and the community should 
be aiming for answers that expose the meaning, within the community, 
of categorical classifications. Once those meanings are exposed and 
evaluated, they are no longer categories of individuals and of 'others'. 
The conclusions drawn from this process should provide the law 
school with meaningful input about what it wants to achieve and not 
numerical minimums/maximums within the constraints of a first year 
class. This process of questioning, exposing and evaluating engaged by 
the law school in consideration of all its admission objectives should not 
be limited to historically disadvantaged communities. Therefore com-
munity should be defined in the broad sense. For this method to be 
effective, all admission considerations need to be exposed, re-evaluated, 
and re-constmcted, including asking questions about what it means to be 
a white male and a white woman. The aim of this process is to force the 
law school to dynamically engage itself in creating a profile of its first 
year class by delicately balancing non-categorical assumptions and 
maintaining a contextual assessment of its admission procedures. By 
adopting this approach, the law school reconstmcts its relationship to its 
students, staff, and community thereby no longer being complicit in 
locating difference in individuals. 
The second step of the process includes the law school translating its 
profile research into a profile questionnaire to be sent out to law school 
applicants. The questions asked of the law school's prospective students 
should be designed to provide a sorting mechanism that distinguishes 
those students who meet the law school's profile from those who do not. 
The results of the profile application should be considered equally with 
reference letters, a personal statement and an assessment of the GP A. 
The significance of GPA and LSAT, as admission criterion, should be 
deflated such that a comprehensive profile can play a greater role in 
detem1ining whether an applicant is offered an interview. Disallowing 
the GP A and LSAT from playing their historically significant roles does 
not mean that both should not play a role in the admission process. The 
LSAT score, indeed, has been recognised as a poor predictor of law 
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school performance and should be eliminated in order for the GP A and 
the profile to play greater roles. The GPA, however, should continue to 
be a factor in determining academic excellence and it should be used 
with the profile (and letters of reference and personal statement) to 
detennine who is granted an interview. By the means of a carefully 
constructed and thorough sorting mechanism that elicits whether the 
applicant meets the law school's requirements, the overarching goal of 
the admission process should be to evaluate the applicant as a whole. 
Once the law school has received the application package, appli-
cants are selected for interviews. The committee that determines who is 
interviewed should consist of members from the faculty of the law 
school, a lay member of the community as well as a current student of 
the law school. There should be a total of three committees in the 
admission process. The second committee should be responsible for 
interviewing applicants and the third committee should be mandated 
with making the final determination regarding offers of admission. 
However, only the committees responsible for determining who is 
granted an interview and for interviewing the applicants should consist 
of members from the faculty of the law school, a lay member of the 
community and a current student of the law school and they should not 
be staffed by the same individuals. For instance, the lay community 
member of the committee that dete1mines whether to grant an interview 
should not be the same person as the lay community member in the 
committee that interviews the applicants. Having three committees 
mandated with separate tasks is necessary for the reason that it allows 
for a complete assessment, aligned with the goals of the law school's 
admissions policies, of the applicant. In addition, the reconstruction of a 
law school admission process must safeguard itself from reverting back 
to the traditional notions of an ideal law student. 
As the third step in the admission process, the law school should 
interview all students who meet the aforementioned criteria. Interviews 
should be considered essential and should be structured such that those 
skills, perspectives, life experiences and achievements valued by the law 
school are expanded upon and evaluated. The membership of the com-
mittee and the questions asked in the interview provide a mechanism 
where, through a collective discussion, the reconstructed ideas of the 
profile and the goals of the law school admission program meet to assess 
the qualifications of the applicant and whether the applicant would meet 
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the needs of the institution and the community. The fomih and final step 
involves the admission committee evaluating the conclusions of the 
committee that determined who would be interviewed and the conclu-
sions from the panels that interviewed the applicants. This committee 
should consist of the law school Dean and faculty members. This 
reconstructed paradigm, therefore, attempts to confront and evaluate 
what current admission mechanisms fail to address, to the extent that 
they encourage dilemmas of identity and equality. It is a method where 
the law school is engaged in re-evaluation and is held accountable for 
the reconstruction of the 'norm'. 
A hint of the epistemological claim that supports the theoretical 
premise of the aforementioned strategies is found in bell hooks' preface 
of from margin to center: 
Living as we did on the edge- we developed a particular way of 
seeing reality. We looked both from the outside in and from the inside 
out. We focused our attention on the center as well as on the margin. 
We understood both. This mode of seeing reminded us of the existence 
of the whole universe, a main body made up of both margin and 
center. 104 
To adopt this strategy is to adopt a particular way of looking at the 
world and how we attain knowledge in it. Under this claim to knowledge 
the knower conceives truth as situated and partial. 105 Baiilett suggests 
that positionality is useful as an epistemological claim in that it locates 
truth in relationships and, consequently, regards truth as paiiial and as 
plural. Indeed it follows that, under this claim to knowledge, difference 
in itself is contingent and contextual. As difference inheres in relations 
and as relationships are the source of knowledge, it becomes unsupp01i-
able to ascribe independent meaning to difference. Given that the attain-
ment of knowledge is achieved through context and relationships, 
Baiilett suggests "the key to increasing knowledge lies in the effort to 
extend one's limited perspective."106 In doing so, diversity becomes the 
starting point of understanding commonality. Bartlett submits that " 
from the positionality stance, I can attain self-knowledge through the 
io4 Supra note 64 at ix. 
105 K. T. Bartlett, "Feminist Legal Methods" (February 1990) 103:4 Harvard Law Review 829 
at 880. 
w6 Ibid at 881. 
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effort to identify not only what is different, but also what I have in 
common with those who have other perspectives."107 Thus positionality 
re-places the strategy on all individuals rather than on only those who 
are considered different. It provides a basis for, "commitment and 
political action, but views these commitments as provisional and subject 
to further critical evaluation and revision." 108 
(i) A Practical Application of the Framework to Identity 
By engaging in an analysis regarding 'difference' and equality, an 
account of identity emerges where identity is meaningful and suffi-
ciently flexible to allow personal and political expression. Difference 
discourse has challenged us to re-locate difference from the individual to 
relationships. Relocating difference exposes how we are complicit in 
constructing difference. However what difference discourse teaches us 
is not limited to our complicity in constructing difference. It also reveals 
something about identity. 
Returning to the example provided by Nedelsky, it is evident how 
she fundamentally changes a customary method in her classroom in 
order to re-locate difference from those students who speak less often to 
the actual dynamic of the classroom. A consequence of what she does is 
that identity is no longer the site of difference. The female student who 
rarely speaks in class comes to learn that her opinions are valued in 
class. Other students come to value her input. 
To understand how this change occurs, it is worth exposing the 
dynamic of a typical classroom and to make ce1iain psychological 
assumptions. 109 When a student does not raise her hand to speak in class 
it is normally for two reasons. Either the student is disinterested in the 
material or she is too shy to participate in the discussion. A large part of 
that shyness is based on the student's belief that her input is valueless. 
107 Supra note I 04 at 886. 
108 Ibid 880. 
109 Nedelsky suggests that, "a simple set of interactions requires a series of substantive 
judgements: Who talks the most? Are there patterns to the paiiicipation rate? Who appears to 
be 'disadvantaged?' in terms of access to discussion? Is that disadvantage related to systemic 
disadvantage? Is such a relation necessary before trying to remedy it by rules of differential 
access (i.e. 'jumping the queue')? ls equality of access more important, for educational 
purposes, than rewarding quickness, self-confidence, aggressiveness or quality of contribu-
tion?" Supra note 74 at 112. 
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The cun-ent classroom dynamic favours and values those students who 
raise their hands frequently and are able to get their hand seen by the 
professor before others can. However, using Nedelsky's method places 
the value on all students, not only those who raise their hands before 
anyone else. The dynamic is altered. The dismantled dynamic recon-
structs how that student regards herself and how others regard her. She 
no longer thinks of herself as someone who rarely speaks in class. Nor 
do other students regard her as someone who rarely speaks in class. She 
is no longer considered 'different' because she rarely speaks in class, in 
that the value is relocated from those who raise their hands often to 
promoting an atmosphere that encourages diverse participation. In the 
context of the classroom, the student begins to identify herself in the 
absence of feeling different. Likewise other students gain an understand-
ing of her in light of the content of her character and not according to her 
difference from everyone else. 
Using Nedelsky's example demonstrates that the methodology of 
locating difference in relations and using this method to dismantle 
prevailing structures plays a significant role in how we identify indi-
viduals and how individuals identify themselves. This method can 
equally apply to the two additional examples provided in the previous 
section. For instance, the reconstruction of a classroom involving all the 
students and the professor would have contributed to how Emily under-
stands herself and how others understand her. If everyone is engaged in 
the reconstructed classroom, Emily's impairment ceases to signify ste-
reotyping and stigma. Rather the response to the trait becomes an issue 
for the entire community. 110 Similarly, dismantling the entire admis-
sions process to law school where reliance on traditional mechanisms 
are minimised would significantly unsettle how identities are con-
structed in law schools. One can envisage a reconstructed process with 
regards to law school admission where, in response to substantive 
changes, law schools maintain a high level of academic excellence and 
reflect the communities in which they are situated without contributing 
to stigma and stereotypes. 
Difference discourse has provided me with a technique to re-exam-
ine my experiences. It is evident that the problem lies in how we 
110 Supra note 35 at 84. 
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construct difference and how we have institutionalized that construc-
tion. My experiences demonstrated that when other students encoun-
tered me, they saw difference. Based on that difference, assumptions 
and conclusions were formed and the students focused the relationship 
into those conclusions. Therefore my identity was construed based on 
conclusions that they had formed prior to my relationship with them. 
This flawed method exposes the manner in which difference becomes to 
be understood as wholly constitutive of identity. Moreover this method 
reveals our complicity in constructing difference and identity. However, 
in order to dismantle exclusionary and subordinating practices, energy 
must be focused on the formation of relationships committed to equality 
wherein the relationship info1ms identity and identity infonns the rela-
tionship. 
V CONCLUSION 
Although Mr. Justice Blackmun's quote is loaded with a complex 
account of identity and equality, his quote misleads the reader to regard 
the problem of exclusion and subordination as one of identity. He 
suggests that to get beyond racism we must first consider race. Implic-
itly, according to Blackmun J's quote, law works to accommodate those 
who are targeted because of who they are immutably perceived to be. 
The analysis of the impartial trajectory and the categorical trajectory 
revealed that to cast the problem of racism in this manner perpetuates the 
privileging of some over others based on their difference. Either we 
disregard difference or we accommodate it. Both methods inform the 
law that difference is inherent to the individual. 
However, by targeting exclusionary and oppressive practices, 
intersectionality and anti-essentialist critiques reveal that the specificity 
of lived experiences does not necessarily require the law to accommo-
date. Rather, insofar as difference inheres in relations, identity is formed 
within context. Inspired by my experiences in first year law, this paper 
asks that the understanding inherent in Blackmun J's quote be reformu-
lated. To get beyond subordination, we must first use the law to ask 
substantive questions that will reveal how difference is constructed and 
we must first take into account the answers therefrom to reconstruct 
identity and equality. 
